We consider general networks of bilateral contracts that include supply chains. We define a new stability concept, called trail stability, and show that any network of bilateral contracts has a trailstable outcome whenever agents' choice functions satisfy full substitutability. Trail stability is a natural extension of chain stability, but is a stronger solution concept in general contract networks. Trail-stable outcomes are not immune to deviations of arbitrary sets of firms. In fact, we show that outcomes satisfying an even more demanding stability property -full trail stability -always exist. For fully trailstable outcomes, we prove results on the lattice structure, the rural hospitals theorem, strategy-proofness and comparative statics of firm entry and exit. We pin down a condition under which trail-stable and fully trail-stable outcomes coincide. We then completely describe the relationships between various other concepts. When contracts specify trades and prices, we also show that competitive equilibrium exists in networked markets even in the absence of fully transferrable utility. The competitive equilibrium outcome is (fully) trail-stable.
Introduction
supplies coal to a steel factory. The factory uses coal to produce steel, which is an input for a manufacturing firm that sells mining equipment back to the mine. This creates a contract cycle. However, Hatfield and Kominers (2012) showed that if a contract network has a contract cycle then set-stable outcomes may fail to exist. Our first result shows that checking whether an outcome is in fact set-stable is computationally hard. We then show that, even in the presence of contract cycles, outcomes that satisfy a weaker notion of stability -trail stability -can still be found. A trail of contracts is a sequence of distinct contracts in which a seller (buyer) in one contract is a buyer (seller) in the subsequent one. We argue that trail stability is a useful, natural and intuitive equilibrium concept for the analysis of matching markets in networks. Along a blocking trail, firms make unilateral offers to their neighbors while conditionally accepting a sequence of previous pairwise blocks. Firms can receive several offers along the trail. Trail-stable outcomes rule out any sequence of such consecutive pairwise blocks. Trail stability is equivalent to chain stability (and therefore to set stability under our assumptions) in acyclic contract networks and to pairwise stability in two-sided many-to-many matching markets with contracts. Unsurprisingly, therefore, trail-stable outcomes may also be Pareto inefficient (Blair, 1988) .
In order to analyze properties of trail-stable outcomes, we introduce another stability notion, called full trail stability, which does not force intermediary firms to accept all the contracts along a trail, but rather only sign upstream/downstream pairs as they are offered along the trail. We argue that this could also be seen as a useful stability notion for short-run contract relationships. But studying full trail stability also allows us to use familiar fixed-point theorems and other techniques from the matching literature. Fully trail-stable outcomes correspond to the fixed-points of an operator and form a particular lattice structure for terminal agents, who can sign only upstream or only downstream contracts. The lattice reflects the classic oppositionof-interests property of two-sided markets, but in our case it is between terminal buyers and terminal sellers.
In addition to this strong lattice property, we extend previous results on the existence of buyer-and selleroptimal stable outcomes, the rural hospitals theorem, strategy-proofness as well as comparative statics on firm entry and exit that have only been studied in a supply-chain or two-sided setting under general choice functions (see Figure 1 .2). Fully trail-stable and trail-stable coincide under separability, a condition that ensures that decisions over certain pairs of upstream and downstream contracts are taken independently from others. We provide a complete description of the relationships between all stability notions -set stability, chain stability, trail stability, full trail stability -that we use in this paper.
Our work complements a recent paper by Hatfield et al. (2015) on the properties of set-stable outcomes in general contract networks. They show that in general contract networks, under certain conditions, setstable outcomes coincide with (what we call) strongly trail-stable outcomes i.e. those immune to coordinated deviations by a set of firms which is simultaneously signing a trail of contracts. Our paper is also related to the stability of (continuous and discrete) network flows discussed by Fleiner (2009 Fleiner ( , 2014 . In these models, agents choose the amount of "flow" they receive from upstream and downstream agents and have preferences over who they receive the "flow" from. The network flow model allows for cycles. However, the choice functions in the network flow models are restricted by Kirchhoff's (current) law (the total amount of incoming (current) flow is equal to the total amount of outgoing flow) and in the discrete case, these choice functions are special cases of Ostrovsky (2008) . This paper therefore generalizes both of the supply chain and the network flow models, while offering two appealing new stability concepts.
We also consider a setting in which every contract specifies a trade and a price. We ask whether there is a competitive equilibrium outcome: a vector of prices at which agents demand precisely the trades which are realized. However, to specify competitive equilibrium fully, we also need to find prices for trades that are not realized. We find these prices constructively by adapting the salary-adjustment process of Kelso and Crawford (1982) and Roth (1984) . While and Hatfield and Kominers (2015b) also considered the existence of competitive equilibrium in general contract networks, in addition to the assumptions in this paper, they also assumed that firms' profit functions are quasilinear in a continuous numeraire (i.e. there is transferrable utility). These assumptions not only guarantee the existence, but also efficiency and stability of competitive equilibrium. However, the quasilinearity of the firms' profit function is a strong assumption in many settings. Several reasons for the failure of this assumption can be found in the empirical literature. First, firms may have financing constraints since access to debt and equity financing differs across firms (Fazzari et al., 1988) . Second, firm management may exhibit a version of the "wealth effect" by investing free cash flow into wasteful investments (Jensen, 1986) . Finally, there is evidence that in volatile markets firms are risk-averse (Frank, 1990) . Hatfield et al. (2013, p. 18 ) point out that:
for contractual sets that allow for continuous transfers, in the presence of quasilinearity, supply chain structure is not necessary for the existence of stable outcomes, although full substitutability is. It is an open question why the presence of a continuous numeraire can replace the assumption of a supply chain structure in ensuring the existence of stable outcomes.
We dispense with quasilinearity entirely while retaining a general network structure. We establish the existence of competitive equilibrium in networked markets without transferrable utility under two extra mild conditions. 4 The competitive equilibrium outcomes are also trail-stable. We proceed as follows. In Section 2, we present the ingredients of 4 There has been relatively little work on the existence of competitive equilibrium with indivisible goods without transferrable utility, except in one-to-one markets (Quinzii, 1984 , Gale, 1984 , Demange and Gale, 1985 , Alaei et al., 2011 , Morimoto and Serizawa, 2015 , Herings, 2015 the model, including the contract network, restrictions on firms choices of contracts, and various stability concepts. In Section 2.5, we show that set stability is computationally intractable in general contract networks. Then, in Section 3, we state our key result of trail-stable outcomes in general contract networks.
We then introduce full trail stability and dig deeper into the structure of fully trail-stable outcomes in Section 3.1. We conclude this section by describing overall relationship between different stability notions. In Section 4, we show how to construct competitive equilibrium allocations in a model with prices. Finally, we conclude and outline some directions for future work. The proofs are in the Appendix.
Model

Ingredients
There is finite set of agents (firms or consumers) F and a finite set of contracts (contract network) X. 5 A contract x ∈ X is a bilateral agreement between a buyer b(x) ∈ F and a seller s(x) ∈ F . Hence,
} is the set of firms associated with contract x and, more generally, F (Y ) is the set of firms associated with contract set Y ⊆ X. Call X B f ≡ {x ∈ X|b(x) = f } and X S f ≡ {x ∈ X|s(x) = f } the sets of f 's upstream and downstream contracts -for which f is a buyer and a seller, respectively. Clearly, Y B f and Y S f form a partition over the set of contracts Y f ≡ {y ∈ Y |f ∈ F (y)} which involve f , since an agent cannot be a buyer and a seller in the same contract.
We can show graphically that our structure is more general than the setting described by Ostrovsky (2008) or Hatfield and Kominers (2012) . Each firm f ∈ F is associated with a vertex of a directed multigraph (F, X) and each contract x ∈ X is a directed edge of this graph. For any f , X B f is represented by a set of incoming edges and X S f is represented by outgoing edges. In Figure 2 .1, we illustrate a three-level supply chain with two producers, two intermediaries and two final consumers. Supply chains require a partial order on the firms' positions in the chain although firms may sell to (buy from) any downstream (upstream) level. Hence, in Figure 2 .1, the right producer sells directly to the left consumer bypassing the intermediary. In our model, we consider general contract networks, which may contain contract cycles (i.e. directed cycles on the graph), Every firm has a choice function
We say that choice functions of f ∈ F satisfy the irrelevance of rejected contracts (IRC) condition if for any Y ⊆ X and (Blair, 1988 , Alkan, 2002 , Fleiner, 2003 , Echenique, 2007 , Aygün and Sönmez, 2013 .
For any Y ⊆ X and Z ⊆ X, define the chosen set of upstream contracts
which is the set of contracts f chooses as a buyer when f has access to upstream contracts Y and downstream contracts Z. Analogously, define the chosen set of downstream contracts
Hence, we can define rejected sets of contracts
A set of contracts A ⊆ X is individually rational for an agent f ∈ F if C f (A f ) = A f . We call set A acceptable if A is individually rational for all agents f ∈ F . For sets of contracts W, A ⊆ X, we say that
Note that contract set A is individually rational for agent f if and only if it is
Note that any rational pair consists of exactly one upstream and one downstream contract.
Assumptions on choice functions
We can now state our key assumption on choice functions introduced by Ostrovsky (2008) . Definition 1. Choice functions of f ∈ F are fully substitutable if for all Y ⊆ Y ⊆ X and Z ⊆ Z ⊆ X they are:
1. Same-side substitutable (SSS):
Contracts are fully substitutable if every firm regards any of its upstream or any of its downstream contracts as substitutes, but its upstream and downstream contracts as complements. Hence, rejected downstream (upstream) contracts continue to be rejected whenever the set of offered downstream (upstream) contracts expands or whenever the set of offered upstream (downstream) contracts shrinks.
We also introduce a new restriction on choice functions that will play a major role in linking together various stability concepts described in this paper.
Definition 2. Choice functions of f ∈ F are separable if for any A, W ⊆ X and y ∈ X B f \ A and z ∈ X S f \ A, whenever A is (W, f )-rational, and {y, z} is a (W, f )-rational pair, then A ∪ {y, z} is (W, f )-rational.
Separable choice functions impose a kind of independence on choices of pairs of upstream and downstream contracts. It says that whenever the firm chooses A alongside some set W and {y, z} alongside W (but y and z would not be chosen separately alongside W since {y, z} is a (W, f )-rational pair), then it would choose A ∪ {y, z} alongside W . Suppose signing A and {y, z} are decisions made by separate units of the firm. Separable choice functions say that it can delegate the joint input-output decisions to the units because its overall choices do not require any coordination between the units. One natural example of separable choice functions is the following: suppose each firms totally orders individual upstream contracts and individual downstream contracts. Whenever a firm is offered k downstream and l upstream contracts, it chooses the z best upstream and the z best downstream contracts where z = min(k, l). As the example shows, separability is closely resembles 'responsiveness" in the contract network setting (Roth, 1985a) . It is worth noting, however, that separability, unlike responsiveness, does not imply full substitutability.
Laws of Aggregate Demand and Supply
We first re-state the familiar Laws of Aggregate Demand and Supply (LAD/LAS) Milgrom, 2005, Hatfield and Kominers, 2012) . LAD (LAS) states that when a firm has more upstream (downstream) contracts available (holding the same downstream (upstream) contracts), the number of downstream (upstream) contracts the firms chooses does not increase more than the number of upstream (downstream) contracts the firm chooses. Intuitively, an increase in the availability of contracts on one side, does not increase the difference between the number of contracts signed on either side. 
We can easily show that LAD/LAS imply IRC, extending the result by Aygün and Sönmez (2013) . Lemma 1. In any contract network X if choice functions of f ∈ F satisfy full substitutability and LAD/LAS then the choice functions of f satisfy IRC.
Terminal agents and terminal superiority
We now introduce some terminology that describes contracts of agents, who only act as buyers or only act as sellers. A firm f is a terminal seller if there are no upstream contracts for f in the network and f is a terminal buyer if the network does not contain any downstream contracts for f . An agent who is either a terminal buyer or a terminal seller is called a terminal agent. Let T denote the set of terminal agents in F and for a set A of contracts let us denote the terminal contracts of A by A T := {A f |f ∈ T }. A set Y of contracts is terminal-acceptable if there is an acceptable set A of contracts such that Y = A T . If A and W are terminal-acceptable sets of contracts then we say that A is seller-superior to W (denoted by 
Stability concepts
We start off by defining two stability notions that have appeared in previous work.
1. A is acceptable.
2. There exist no non-empty blocking set of contracts Z ⊆ X, such that Z ∩A = ∅ and Z is (A, f )-rational for all f ∈ F (Z).
Set-stable outcome are immune to deviations by sets of firms, which can re-contract freely among themselves while keeping any of their existing contracts. Set-stable outcomes always exist in acyclic networks if choice functions are fully substitutable. In order to study more general contract networks, we first introduce trails of contracts.
holds for all m = 1, . . . , M − 1.
While a trail may not contain the same contract more than once, it may include the same agents any number of times. Figure 2 .2 illustrates a trail that starts from firm i to firm j via firm k. A trail T is a chain if all the agents F (T ) involved in the trail are distinct. A chain from firm i to firm j is illustrated in Figure 2 .1.
2. There is no trail T , such that T ∩ A = ∅ and T is (A, f )-rational for all f ∈ F (T ). Hatfield et al. (2015) showed that in general contract networks set-stable outcomes are equivalent to strongly trail-stable outcomes whenever choice functions satisfy full substitutability and Laws of Aggregate Demand and Supply. 9 However, Fleiner (2009) and Hatfield and Kominers (2012) showed that a set-stable outcomes may not exist in general contract networks (see Example 1 below). Moreover, our first result demonstrates that set stability is computationally intractable. Let us define decision problem GS as follows. An instance of GS is a trading network with a set of agents F and set of contracts X (with choice functions that satisfy full substitutability and IRC) and an outcome A. The answer for an instance of GS is YES if the particular outcome A is not set-stable (that is, if there is a set of contracts Z that blocks A), otherwise the answer is NO.
Theorem 1. Problem GS is NP-complete. Moreover, if choice functions are represented by oracles then finding the right answer for an instance of GS might need an exponential number of oracle calls.
The non-existence of set-stable outcomes and their computational intractability motivates us to define a less restrictive stability notions.
We first define trail stability, which coincides with pairwise stability in a two-sided many-to-many matching market with contracts (Roth, 1984) and with chain stability in supply chains Ostrovsky (2008, p. 903) .
.., x m } ∩ T f to be firm f 's contracts out of the first m contracts in the trail and
2. There is no trail T = {x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x M }, such that T ∩ A = ∅ and (a) x 1 is (A, f 1 )-rational for f 1 = s(x 1 ) and (b) At least one of the following two options holds:
The above trail T is called a blocking trail to A.
Trail stability is a natural stability concept when firms interact mainly with their buyers and suppliers and deviations by arbitrary sets of firms are difficult to arrange. In a trail-stable outcome, no agent wants to drop his contracts and there exists no set of consecutive bilateral contracts comprising a trail preferred by all the agents in the trail to the current outcome. First, f 1 makes an unilateral offer of x 1 (the first contract in the trail) to the buyer f 2 . At this stage seller f 1 does not consider whether he may act as a buyer or a seller in the trail again (in that sense the deviations are pairwise and consecutive). The buyer f 2 then either unconditionally accepts the offer (forming a blocking trail) or conditionally accepts the seller's offer while looking to offer a contract (x 2 ) to another buyer f 3 . If f 2 's buyer in x 2 happens to be f 1 , then f 1 considers the offer of x 2 together with x 1 (which he has already offered). If f 1 accepts, we have a blocking trail. If 10 Note that as the blocking trail grows, we ensure that each intermediate agent wants to choose all his contracts along the trail.
In general, trail stability is a weaker stability notion than set stability. The following example illustrates that trail-stable outcomes are not necessarily set-stable.
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Example 1 (Trail-stable outcomes are not necessarily set-stable). Consider four contracts x, y, z and m.
Agents have the following preferences that induce fully substitutable choice functions:
Hence, a trail-stable outcome exists: A = {w}.
13 The trail-stable outcome is Pareto inefficient as {w} is the least preferred outcome for all agents. There is, however, no set-stable outcome.
14 To illustrate trail stability further, let us drop agents i and m and their corresponding contracts from the example above. The new preferences of j are {y, z} j ∅. There is one set-stable outcome {y, z}. There are, however, two trail-stable outcomes: ∅ and {y, z}. Is ∅ a reasonable possible outcome of this market?
We argue that, in a variety of richer economic models of contracts, it may well be. Suppose that firms are unable to have a joint meeting and must resort to making a unilateral offers. Either firm may be reluctant to make the first offer because in absence of the counteroffer it could end up revealing sensitive information about its costs. Therefore, firms are unable to coordinate {y, z} and are stuck in the "inefficient equilibrium".
As such, trail stability provides a natural solution concept for matching markets in which firms have limited ability to coordinate their decisions in the contract network.
Existence and properties of stable outcomes
We can now state the first key result of this paper.
Theorem 2. In any contract network X if choice functions of F are fully substitutable and satisfy IRC then there exists a trail-stable outcome A ⊆ X.
This theorem establishes a positive existence result for stable outcomes in general contract networks:
under the usual assumptions, trail-stable outcomes always exist.
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Fully trail-stable outcomes
In order to examine the structure of trail-stable outcomes, we need to introduce another stability notion.
2. There is no trail
, and
The above trail T is called a locally blocking trail to A.
Full trail stability may, at first glance, appear to be an unappealing stability concept. While it rules out (locally) blocking trails, it does not require, as trail stability, that agents accept all their contracts along such blocking trails. More formally, a locally blocking trail may not be an acceptable blocking trail. However, full trail stability has an interesting and important economic interpretation. Suppose contracts only need to be fulfilled sequentially i.e. once a firm's upstream contract has been fulfilled, it immediately fulfils its downstream contract. 16 This is a natural assumption in sequential production networks as production may not be able to continue without inputs and inputs would not be bought without a standing order. Then firms do not need to worry about being involved in multiple chains of contracts along the trail since they never need to be fulfilled together. As such full trail stability can be a useful stability concept in production networks in which production is sequential rather than (possibly) simultaneous. Full trail stability may be a better stability concept for a short-run prediction of network stability whereas trail stability is more suitable for the long run. It turns out that fully trail-stable outcomes also exist in general production networks.
Lemma 2. In any contract network X if choice functions of F are fully substitutable and satisfy IRC then there exists a fully trail-stable outcome A ⊆ X.
In order to prove Lemma 2, we use tools familiar to matching theory, such as the Tarski fixed-point theorem (Adachi, 2000 , Fleiner, 2003 , Echenique and Oviedo, 2004 , 2006 , Hatfield and Milgrom, 2005 , Ostrovsky, 2008 , Hatfield and Kominers, 2012 . Let X B and X S be two subsets of X which represent the set of contracts offered to buyers and sellers. We define an isotone operator Φ that acts on (X B , X S ) and any fixed-point (Ẋ B ,Ẋ S ) of Φ corresponds to a fully trail-stable outcome A =Ẋ B ∩Ẋ S . These tools allow us to explore properties of fully trail-stable outcomes that have previously only been explored in a supply-chain or a two-sided setting. Recall that in the marriage model of Gale and Shapley, the existence of man-optimal and 15 Since trail stability is, in general, stronger than chain stability, Theorem 2 also implies than any contract network has a chain-stable outcome. Our results do not contradict Theorem 5 on the non-existence of set-stable outcomes in Hatfield and Kominers (2012) since Theorem 2 only considers the existence of trail-stable outcomes.
16 Alternatively, contracts further down the trail could be specified to be fulfilled later.
woman-optimal stable matchings follow from the well-known lattice structure of stable matchings. The key to extending this result to contract networks is to consider only terminal agents. We say that a fully trailstable outcome A max (A min ) that is buyer-optimal (seller-optimal ) if any terminal buyer (terminal seller) prefers it to any other outcome i.e. for any fully trail-stable Z ⊆ X, we have that
Lemma 3. In any contract network X if choice functions of F are fully substitutable and satisfy IRC then the set of fully trail-stable outcomes contains buyer-optimal and seller-optimal outcomes.
Lemma 3 extends Theorem 4 by Hatfield and Kominers (2012) , which establishes the existence of buyerand seller-optimal outcomes in acyclic trading networks. 17 We say that Y ⊆ X is terminal-fully-trail-stable if there is a fully trail-stable outcome A ⊆ X such that Y = A T . 18 This establishes full "polarization of interests" in trail-stable outcomes in the sense of (Roth, 1985b) and immediately implies the existence of buyer-optimal (A max ) and seller-optimal (A min ) fully trail-stable outcomes. Therefore, our result substantially strengthens and generalizes the previous results by Roth (1985b) , Blair (1988) , Echenique and Oviedo (2006) and Hatfield and Kominers (2012) .
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The lattice structure of fully-trail stable outcomes allows us to straightforwardly extend two well-known properties of stable outcomes that have been known in two-sided matching markets and acyclic contract networks. One such property is the classic "rural hospitals theorem", which shows that in every stable allocation of a two-sided many-to-one doctor-hospital matching market, the same number of doctors are matched to every hospital (Roth, 1986) . In buyer-seller networks, we can instead consider the difference between the number of upstream and downstream contracts that firms sign (Hatfield and Kominers, 2012) .
The following proposition gives the most general rural hospital theorem result.
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Proposition 1. Suppose that in a contract network X choice functions of F are fully substitutable and satisfy LAD/LAS. Then, for each firm, the difference between the number of upstream contracts and the number of downstream contracts is invariant across fully trail-stable allocations.
The lattice structure of fully trail-stable outcomes also gives a (somewhat weak) mechanism design result. A mechanism M is a mapping from a profile of agents' choice functions, C F = (C f ) f ∈F , to the set of outcomes.
Definition 9. A mechanism is group strategy-proof for G ⊆ F if for anyḠ ⊆ G, there does not exist a choice function profileCḠ such that for outcomesĀ = M(CḠ, C F \Ḡ ) and A = M(C F ) we have that
A mechanism is group strategy-proof for a group of agents if they cannot jointly manipulate their choice functions and obtain an outcome that is better for all of them. Like Hatfield and Kominers (2012) , we are only going to consider group strategy-proofness for terminal agents. We generalize their Theorem 10 with the following result.
Proposition 2. Suppose that in a contract network X choice functions of F are fully substitutable and satisfy LAD/LAS and additionally all terminal buyers (terminal sellers) demand at most one contract, then any mechanism that selects the buyer-optimal (seller-optimal) fully trail-stable allocation is group strategyproof for all terminal buyers.
As is well known, the assumptions that underpin Proposition 2 -unit demands and extreme one-sidedness -cannot be substantially relaxed.
21
The second set of properties of fully trail-stable outcomes concerns the effect of entry and exit of new firms in the trading network. This type of comparative static analysis is well-studied in two-sided matching markets (Gale and Sotomayor, 1985 , Crawford, 1991 , Blum et al., 1997 , Hatfield and Milgrom, 2005 . More recently, Ostrovsky (2008) and extended these results the case of supply chains.
First, let us consider what happens when a terminal seller is added to the market. More formally, let F = F ∪ f and let A max and A min be the buyer-optimal and the seller-optimal fully trail-stable outcomes in F respectively. Then every terminal seller f = f is prefers A max to A max and prefers A min to A min , and each terminal buyer f is prefers A max to A max and prefers A min to A min .
The opposite holds when f is terminal buyer.
The proposition says that with a new seller, the seller-optimal outcome A min and the buyer-optimal outcome A max move in the direction favorable to terminal buyers and unfavorable to terminal sellers. Symmetrically, when a terminal buyer is added or if a seller leaves, A min and A max move in the opposite direction.
In other words, more competition on one end of an industry is bad for the agents on that end and good for the agents on the other end. This proposition generalizes Theorem 3 in Ostrovsky (2008) . Now consider the following market readjustment process: When the new terminal seller f enters, and we already have a fully trail-stable outcome A with corresponding fixed point (Ẋ B ,Ẋ S ) then let X be the set of all contracts in the new network, and let us define (Ẋ B ,Ẋ S ) = (Ẋ B ,Ẋ S ∪ X f ). Operator Φ acts on (X B , X S ) using choice functions of F . Let (X B ,X S ) be the fixed point of the iteration of fuction Φ, with associated outcomeÂ =X B ∩X S . ThisÂ be the result of the market readjustment process.
Proposition 4. Consider a contract network X in which choice functions of F are fully substitutable and satisfy IRC and A is a fully trail-stable outcome with associated buyer and seller offer sets X B and X S .
Suppose a new terminal seller f whose choice function is fully substitutable and satisfies IRC enters the market and letÂ be the result of the market readjustment process.
Then, all terminal sellers prefer A toÂ and all terminal buyers (other than f ) preferÂ to A.
An analogous result can be obtained when terminal buyers and terminal sellers exit the market so this proposition generalizes the Theorem in .
Relationships between stability concepts
In this section, we link together all the stability concepts discussed above. We first show that set stability implies full trail stability, which in turn implies trail stability. We also link set stability and trail stability via intensity. We then link trail stable and fully trail-stable outcome via separability. Finally, we explore chain stability (Ostrovsky, 2008) .
The follow lemma ties three key stability concepts together.
Lemma 5. In any contract network X if choice functions of F are fully substitutable and satisfy IRC then the following hold for an outcome A ⊆ X:
A is a fully trail-stable outcome then A is also trail-stable.
(ii) If A is a set-stable outcome then A is fully trail-stable.
Lemma 2 and Lemma 5 immediately imply Theorem 2. We now pin down the role of separability for trail-stable and fully trail-stable outcomes.
Proposition 5. In any contract network X whenever choice functions of F are fully substitutable, separable and satisfy IRC an outcome A ⊆ X is fully trail-stable if and only if it is trail-stable.
Under separability all properties of fully trail-stable outcomes apply to trail-stable outcomes. This is summarized in the following corollary.
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Corollary 1. Suppose that in a contract network X, choice functions of F are fully substitutable, separable and satisfy IRC. Then all properties of fully trail-stable outcomes, described in Lemma 3, Lemma 4, Proposition 1, Proposition 2, Proposition 3 and Proposition 4, apply to trail-stable outcomes.
Separability is crucial for the correspondence between fully trail-stable and trail-stable outcomes. Separability ensures that all blocking trails are locally blocking trails. An example below shows that full trail stability is strictly stronger that trail stability.
Example 2 (Trail-stable outcomes are not always fully trail-stable). Consider agents and contracts described in Example 1 and Figure 2 .3. Agents have the following preferences that induce fully substitutable choice functions:
{z, y} j {w, z} j {y, x} j ∅. The empty set is preferred to any other set of contracts. 22 We also conjecture that in any contract network X if choice functions of F satisfy full substitutability and only LAD/LAS then the terminal-trail-stable contract sets form a lattice under terminal superiority, but leave this for future work.
For outcome A = ∅, the trail {w, z, y, x} is locally blocking trail but not trail-blocking. Therefore, trail-stable outcomes are ∅ and {z, y} but the only fully trail-stable outcome is {z, y}. Note that j's choice function induced by the preference is not separable.
Finally, we explore the relationship between trail stability, set stability and chain stability.
Definition 10. Choice functions of f ∈ F are simple if there exists an "intensity" mapping w : X f → R such that whenever A is a (W, f )-rational set for some acceptable set A of contracts, then for every y ∈ X B f ∩ A there exists z ∈ X S f ∩ A such that w(y) > w(z) holds.
One example of choice functions which are simple are the following: if the agent is offered a set of contracts, he picks the upstream contract y with the highest intensity and a downstream contract z with the lowest intensity (as long as the intensity of the y is greater than of z, otherwise he picks nothing). For example, if the intensity mapping w represents the per-unit price of the contract, then the condition says that the firm only signs a pair of contracts if the price in the downstream contract is greater than the price in the upstream contract, while picking the highest-price downstream contract and the lowest-price upstream contract.
Proposition 6. In any contract network X whenever choice functions of F are fully substitutable, simple and satisfy IRC then an outcome A ⊆ X is set-stable if and only if it is trail-stable.
We now formally define chain stability, introduced by Ostrovsky (2008) . To recap, a chain C is a trail in which all the agents are distinct. Chain-stable outcomes rule out consecutive pairwise deviations along chains. While this stability concept was introduced in the context of acyclic trading network, it could also be applicable to general trading networks in which firms only have one opportunity to recontract during a deviation.
Definition 11. An outcome A ⊆ X is chain-stable if 1. A is acceptable.
2. There is no chain C = {x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x M }, such as C ∩ A = ∅ and (a) x 1 is (A, f 1 )-rational for f 1 = s(x 1 ), and
Since every chain is a trail, every trail-stable outcome is chain-stable. In acyclic networks every trail is also chain, so chain-stable, trail-stable and fully trail-stable outcomes coincide with set-stable outcomes (Hatfield and Kominers, 2012) . However, as the example below shows, chain stability is weaker than trail stability (and hence weaker than full trail stability) in general contract networks.
Example 3 (Chain-stable outcomes are not necessarily trail-stable). Consider agents and contracts described in Examples 1 and 2, and Figure 2 .3. Agents have the following fully substitutable preferences: The empty set is preferred to any other set of contracts. Now, for outcome ∅, the trail {w, z, y, x} is trail-blocking, but there is no blocking chain for A = ∅. Outcome {z, y} is, however, blocked by chain {w, x}. Therefore the only trail-stable outcome is {w, z, y, x} and the chain-stable outcomes are ∅ and {w, z, y, x}. This is intuitive because chains allows the firms to appear in the blocking set only once therefore they rule out fewer possible blocks. 
Competitive equilibrium
We now turn to the existence of competitive equilibrium in our model when each contract specifies a price. We assume that each contract (ω, p ω ) ≡ x ∈ X ≡ Ω × Z specifies a trade ω ∈ Ω and a price p ω ∈ Z. 
Definition 12. Competitive equilibrium is an arrangement [Ψ
We can construct a competitive equilibrium outcome (i.e. a feasible set of contracts) from any competitive arrangement by associating the contracts with the realized trades at competitive equilibrium prices. In order to ensure that prices are indeed assigned to every trade, we introduce two further assumptions:
Definition 13. Complete prices (CP): For every ω ∈ Ω:
1. There exists a pricep ω such that whenever
2. There exists a pricep ω such that whenever
(CP1) says that there exists a vector of (low) prices at which firms want to buy all their upstream trades;
(CP2) says that there exists a vector of (high) prices at which firms want to sell all their downstream trades; (CP3) says whenever a seller rejects a contract for a trade at a particular price and the buyer rejects a contract for the same trade at a higher price, there exists a price (either p ω or p ω + 1) for the trade at which they both reject the contract whenever the set of other offered contracts is unchanged. It is worth highlighting that (CP3) would be innocuous if prices were continuous.
Definition 14. Price Monotonicity (PM):
Consider an outcome A and two other contracts {x, x } / ∈ A for the same trade ω that differ only in price i.e. x = (ω, p ω ) and
This assumption says that all things being equal firms strictly prefer to buy a cheaper upstream trade and to sell a more expensive downstream trade. It extends the "generalized salary condition" (Roth, 1985b) or "Pareto separability" (Roth, 1984) used in the context of two-sided markets in contract networks.
Our price-adjustment process mimics the one described by Kelso and Crawford (1982) and Roth (1984) except that now the sellers are not bound by the agreed contracts. 24 In fact, it is a special case of operator Φ applied on a set of contracts used to prove Lemma 2 but since we are able to keep track of the prices of all trades and we can find supporting competitive equilibrium prices once the process terminates and finds a (fully) trail-stable allocation. The intuition here is that prices of over-demanded trades increase. Initially, every upstream trade is demanded by the buyers. Buyers continue to raise prices of (upstream) trades until every demanded (upstream) trade has a supplier or we can find a set of prices at which neither party wants to trade. This is a (fully) trail-stable contract allocation and from here we can construct competitive equilibrium prices to support it. 25 This gives us our final result.
Theorem 3. Consider a set of contracts X that specifies trades and prices and assume that choice functions of F are fully substitutable, feasible and satisfy IRC. In addition, assume that (CP) and (PM) are satisfied.
Then a competitive equilibrium arrangement exists and a competitive equilibrium outcome is (fully) trailstable.
Conclusion
Set stability is an appealing stability concept, but in general contract networks set-stable outcomes may not exist and they are not computationally tractable. In this paper, we introduced a new natural stability notion for general contract networks, called trail stability. We showed that any contract network has a trail-stable outcome when choice functions are fully substitutable. We then showed that outcomes satisfying an even stronger stability concept -full trail stability -always exist and have a natural lattice structure and inherit a host of properties studied in two-sided and supply-chain settings. Moreover, we described how set-stable outcomes, chain-stable and (fully) trail-stable outcomes are related in general networks. We then showed that in networked markets competitive equilibrium can exist without the quasilinear assumption on utility functions. Full substitutability is crucial for existence of trail-stable outcomes since previous maximal domain results for many-to-many matching markets apply in our case (see, for example, Hatfield and Kominers (2012, Theorem 6) and Hatfield and Kominers (2015a, Theorem 2) ). When firms have quasilinear utility functions, (full) substitutability is not necessary for competitive equilibrium and even when all agents have complementary preferences competitive equilibrium may exist (Baldwin and Klemperer, 2013 , Drexl, 2013 , Hatfield and Kominers, 2015b , Teytelboym, 2014 . Although Alva and Teytelboym (2015) show that trail-stable outcomes exist in supply chains even in the presence of upstream complementarities with general choice functions, it is not clear whether this result can be extended to general contract networks. Finally, it would be interesting to understand how this model can be tested and estimated empirically. This is a fruitful area for future research.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1.
Proof of Theorem 1
Proof of Theorem 1. Problem GS is clearly belongs to complexity class NP as verifying that Z is a blocking set for A requires a polynomial time proof.
To show that GS is NP-hard we reduce the NP-complete partition problem to GS. An instance of the partition problem is given by a k-tuple A = (a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a k ) of positive integers such that a 1 ≤ a 2 ≤ . . . ≤ a k holds. The answer to this problem is YES if and only if there is a subset I of {1, 2, . . . , k} such that i∈I a i = s where 2s = k i=1 a i . So assume that the partition problem is given by A = (a 1 , a 2 . . . a k ). Construct a trading network with firms f and g and with contracts y and x i such that f = s(y) = b(x i ) and
It is easy to check that C f A satisfies the full substitutability condition and IRC. Define C g A as follows:
if Y = {y} and {a i : x i ∈ X, i ≤ t} ≤ s < {a i : x i ∈ X, i < t + 1}
One can readily check that C g A also satisfies the full substitutability condition and IRC. That is, based on the partition problem instance, we have determined a trading network. To define our GS instance, define an outcome A = ∅. We have to show that the answer to the partition problem is YES if and only if A = ∅ is not set-stable.
Assume now that the answer to our partition problem instance is YES, that is i∈I a i = s. Define
Assume now that A = ∅ is not set-stable. This means that there is a blocking set Z to A and define I = {i : x i ∈ Z}, X I := {x i : x i ∈ Z} and Y := Z ∩ {y}. As Z is blocking, we have C
and hence Z is not blocking. Otherwise, Y = {y}, and from C g A (Y |X I ) = (Y |X I ) we get that i∈I a i ≤ s. Moreover, from y ∈ C f A (X I , Y ) we get that i∈I a i ≥ s. Consequently i∈I a i = s, and the answer to the partition problem is YES.
To prove the second part of the theorem, define a contract network with firms f and g and with contracts y and x i such that f = s(y) = b(x i ) and g = b(y) = s(x i ) for for 1 ≤ i ≤ 2n. Define the following choice function
if |X| ≤ n and X = X I It is straightforward to check that choice functions C f 0 and C f I above satisfy the full substitutability condition and IRC. Define the following choice function for g
A for A = (1, 1, . . . , 1), C g also satisfies the full substitutability condition and IRC.
Now assume that an instance of problem GS is given by the above network and an outcome A = ∅.
Assume that the choice functions are not given explicitly, but by value-returning oracles. Moreover, we know exactly that the choice function of g is the one defined in (6.2) and we know that the choice function of f
It is easy to check that A is not set-stable if and only if C f = C f I and in this case the only blocking set is Z = X i ∪ {y}. So if one has to decide set stability of A, then one must determine the C f (Z) values for all such possible Z, and this means 2n n oracle calls.
Proof of Lemma 2
Consider Y B and Z S , which are subsets of X, and represent sets of available upstream and downstream contracts for all agents, respectively. Define a lattice L with the ground set X × X with an order such
Furthermore, define a mapping Φ as follows:
where
Clearly, Φ is isotone (Fleiner, 2003 , Ostrovsky, 2008 , Hatfield and Kominers, 2012 on L. We rely on the following well-known fixed point theorem of Tarski.
Theorem 4. (Tarski, 1955) Let L be a complete lattice and let Φ : L → L be an isotone mapping. Then the set of fixed points of Φ in L is also a complete lattice.
Proof of Lemma 2. Existence of fixed-points of Φ follows from Theorem 4 since (X × X, ) is a complete lattice.
26
We claim that every fixed point (Ẋ B ,Ẋ S ) of Φ corresponds to an outcomeẊ B ∩Ẋ S = A that is fully trail-stable. First, we show that A is individually rational. Observe that if (Ẋ B ,Ẋ S ) is a fixed point thenẊ S ∪Ẋ B = X. To see this suppose for contradiction that there is a contract x / ∈Ẋ S ∪Ẋ B . Then
So x is has to be inẊ S ∪Ẋ B This implies that
Second, we show that A is fully trail-stable. This is similar to Step 1 of the Proof of Lemma 1 in Ostrovsky (2008) . Suppose that T = {x 1 , ...x m } is a locally blocking trail and assume towards a contradiction that
. But we assumed that
Now, consider x 2 . By definition of a locally blocking trail, we have that x 2 ∈ C s(x2) S (A ∪ x 2 |A ∪ x 1 ). Once again by full substitutability and IRC, we obtain that and
. But we assumed that x 2 / ∈ A, so x 2 ∈Ẋ B . Now proceed by induction, we
show that every x ∈ T is inẊ B . Consider the last contract x m . Since
(A ∪ x m |A), using the same argument we had for x 1 , we get that x m ∈Ẋ S . A contradiction.
Now we show that every fully trail-stable outcome corresponds to a fixed point:
Suppose A is fully trail-stable. For every x i / ∈ A, if there exists a trail {x 1 x 2 . . .
Outcome A is individually rational, so C f (A) = A f for all f ∈ F . For every firm f , if f = s(x) and
and y ∈Ẋ B \ A then y / ∈ C f (A ∪ {y}) otherwise the trail ending in y would be a locally blocking trail. From
Proof of Propositions 5, 6 and Lemma 5
The key to this is the following two useful lemmata. In the proofs, we will use the concept of a circuit, which is a closed trail.
Lemma 6. Let F be the set of agents and X be the set of contracts in a contract network with fully substitutable choice functions that satisfy IRC. If Y and Z are disjoint sets of contracts and f is an agent
an analogous statement holds.
Proof of Lemma 6. We can suppose without loss of generality that z ∈ X B f . From the SSS property, it follows that
So if z is not (Y, f )-rational then there are some contracts {z 1 , z 2 . . .
If all of {z 1 , z 2 . . . z k } are (Y, f )-rational, we get option (3).
A consequence of Lemma 6 is that full trail stability is a stronger property than trail stability.
Later we are going to need the following lemma.
Lemma 7. Let F be the set of agents and f be an agent in a contract network with fully substitutable choice functions that satisfy IRC. Assume that Y is acceptable and x 1 , x 2 , . . . ,
The above statement remains true if one or both of the contracts x 1 and z k are void. When we say that x 1 is void, we mean that:
• x 1 is empty, so
• the trail starts with z 1 , and
• instead of (Y, f )-rationality of pair {x 1 , z 1 } we need (Y, f )-rationality of z 1 and i = 1 in the conclusion.
When we say that both x 1 and z k are void, we mean that there is
Proof of Lemma 7. Suppose, for example, that
that both x j and z j exist. Then from CSC,
In the case that x 1 is void and
. This is impossible when z 1 is (Y, f )-rational but none of the other z j contracts are (Y, f )-rational. Therefore if we have found (Y, f )-rational pair {x i , z j }, then at least one of x i and z j was not
Proof of Lemma 5. Consider a fully trail-stable outcome A. Suppose that A is not trail-stable, i.e. there exists a blocking trail T = {x 1 , x 2 . . . x M } for it. Without the loss of generality, we may assume that (b)ii holds in Definition 7. The other case when (b)i holds can be proved analogously.
We are going to find indices
• b(x im−1 ) = s(x im ) = f m and {x im−1 , x im } is a (A, f m )-rational pair for all 1 < m ≤ l, and
So this subset of the trail forms a locally blocking trail T .
In the blocking trail T , choose the last contract x i ∈ T such that x i is (A, s(x i ))-rational. There is at least one contract like this, since x 1 is (A, s(x 1 ))-rational by definition. Let i 1 := i.
Suppose we have already found i 1 . . . i m that satisfies our requirements. If x im is (A, b(x im ))-rational, we end the trail there, and let l = m. Otherwise, from the definition of blocking trails, for f m+1 = b(x im ),
Using Lemma 6, there is a contract
f such that i m+1 > i m and {x im−1 , x im } is a (A, f m )-rational pair. This way, we constructed a locally blocking trail, therefore A is not fully trail-stable.
To show that every set-stable outcome is fully trail-stable, consider an outcome A which is not fully trailstable, and choose the shortest locally blocking trail T for it. For every firm involved in T , if
then using Lemma 7 there is a upstream-downstream contract-pair x j ∈ T and z l ∈ T such that j = l and {x j , z l } is (A, f )-rational. This way we get a shorter locally blocking trail or circuit. Since this was the shortest trail, it must be a circuit. Repeat finding shortcuts until we get a circuit Z such that
, and the set of ending half-contracts (buyer's side) with X Lemma 10. If F : 2 (X,X) → 2 (X,X) is -isotone and a w-contraction then fixed points of F form a nonempty sublattice of (2 (X,X) , ∪, ∩)
Proof. By Tarski's fixed-point theorem, the set of fixed points is nonempty. Now let U ⊆ (X, X) and
From the w-contraction property and Lemma 8
hence there must be equality throughout. Using the third part of Lemma 8 we can see that (U ∩ V ) = F (U ∩ V ) and (U ∪ V ) = F (U ∪ V ) so they are also fixed points of F . 
. If the choice functions of all agents are fully substitutable and satisfy LAD/LAS, then the fixed
Since R is -isotone, Φ is also -isotone. We need to show that Φ is a w-contraction. Suppose
Lemma 9 we showed that R is a w-contraction.
Since Φ is -isotone and a w-contraction, Lemma 10 gives that the fixed points of Φ form a sublattice of (2 (X,X) , ∪, ∩).
Lattice for the terminal agents
Lemma 11. If choice function C : 2 X → 2 X is same-side substitutable and satisfies IRC then
Lemma 12. For a set of contracts X, if choice functions of F are fully substitutable and satisfy IRC, then terminal superiority is a partial order on terminal-fully-trail-stable outcomes.
Proof of Lemma 12. We need to prove that S is reflexive, antisymmetric and transitive. Assume that A, A and A are acceptable outcomes. As
holds for each agent (and hence for each
any terminal agent f , hence A = A and S is antisymmetric. For transitivity, assume that A S A S A .
Using this and Lemma 11, we get for any terminal agent f that
hence A S A holds, indeed. This completes the proof.
Theorem 7. If L is a nonempty complete sublattice of (2
is a sublattice of (2 T × 2 T , ∪, ∩).
T }.
Given two fully trail-stable outcomes A and A , let us denote the canonical stable pair (defined as at the end of Proof of Lemma 2) for A withẊ B andẊ S , and the canonical stable pair for A withẊ B andẊ S .
Lemma 13. Given two fully trail-stable outcomes A and 
For the opposite direction, take a contract x ∈ X f such that x / ∈ C f (A f ∪ x). We use Lemma 12,
When we define the stable pairs for A and A , if Moreover, if the choice functions satisfy LAD/LAS, then fixed points of Φ form a sublattice L of (2 X × 2 X , ∪, ∩). From Lemma 7, the projection of the above lattice to the terminals, L T is also a lattice under and from Lemma 13 this partial order coincides with S . Therefore, the fully trail-stable outcomes form a lattice under terminal-superiority.
Proofs of Propositions 3 and 4
Our proof is similar to Ostrovsky's proof. First we investigate the restabilized outcome from A, which we play part in the proofs of both Propositions 3 and 4. Let A be an arbitrary fully trail-stable outcome in the original network, with a correspondong canonical pair (Ẋ B ,Ẋ S ). After the new terminal seller f arrives, let X be the set of all contracts in the new network, and let us define (X * B , X * S ) = (Ẋ B ,Ẋ S ∪ X f ). In the following, we will use Φ according to the choice fuctions on the new network, so (Ẋ B ,Ẋ S ) does not need to be a fixed point of Φ anymore.
For example, if f has a conctracts with f , contract x = f f was not offered for firm f in X * B so it does not get rejected.
So (X * B , X * S ) Φ(X * B , X * S ), and Φ is -isotone, so Φ(X * B , X * S ) Φ(Φ(X * B , X * S )) and so on. The lattice of all possible subset-pairs is finite, so there is a k such that was fixed before the new agent arrived, C f (Z B ) = A f,max and C f (Z * B ) = A f,max and Z * B ⊆ Z B so from C f (Z B ) ⊆ (A f,max ∪A f,max ) ⊆ Z B by IRC we obtain C f (A f,max ∪A f,max ) = A f,max so A f,max is preferred by terminal buyers.
Similarly, if f is a terminal seller outside f , C f (Z S ) = A f,max and C f (Z * S ) = A f,max and Z S ⊆ Z * S so from C f (Z * S ) ⊆ (A f,max ∪ A f,max ) ⊆ Z * S by IRC we obtain C f (A f,max ∪ A f,max ) = A f,max so A f,max is preferred by terminal buyers.
If f is a terminal buyer then we can use the same proof with reversing the roles of buyers and sellers.
Proof of Proposition 4. If f is a terminal seller, and A is any fully trail-stable outcome in the original network, with canonical pair (Ẋ B ,Ẋ S ), then (X * B , X * S ) = (Ẋ B ,Ẋ S ∪ X f ) (X B ,X S ). The restabilized outcome isÂ =X B ∩X S , and similarly to the proof of Proposition 3 one can show that initial producers weakly prefer A toÂ and all end consumers (other than f ) preferÂ to A.
If f is a terminal buyer, preferences are the opposite.
Proof of Theorem 3
First three lemmata adapt construction of a stable outcome in the two-sided many-to-many market with contracts and prices by Roth (1984) . We take the perspective of buyers i.e. buying firms are offering their upstream trades to corresponding sellers.
Lemma 14. Prices are specified for each trade at every step.
Proof. Using (CP1), (CP2) and (PM), we know that all firms offer all their upstream trades at pricesp at step 1. Hence, prices arep and every trade has a price at step 1. In the subsequent steps t > 1, since choice functions are feasible, any firm will choose at most one trade at a given price. One of three situations may occur to any trade ω.
1. If a trade ω is offered at p * ω = p ω (t) and rejected by s(ω), its price is fixed at p * ω until it is offered again.
2. If a trade ω is offered at p * * ω = p ω (t) and not rejected by s(ω), its price is fixed at p * * ω (until the seller breaks the contract).
3. If a trade ω is not offered, its price remains at the level p * ω when it was last offered and rejected.
In every step, we have specified what the price of every trade is, which completes the proof.
Lemma 15. Prices of all trades are not decreasing in every round.
Proof. This follows from (PM). Since firms offer their most preferred upstream trades, a firm would never offer an upstream trade (ω, p ω + 1) if (ω, p ω ) had not been rejected. Proof of Theorem 3. When the algorithm terminates (by Tarski fixed-point theorem, it must), we are at a (fully) trail-stable outcome A (by Theorem 2).
We tracked a price for every trade (by Lemma 14). For trades Ψ = τ (A) that are realized at the trailstable outcome A, we assign prices specified in A to those trades. Clearly, these trades are chosen at these prices since the corresponding contracts are chosen. If τ (A) = Ω, this indeed a competitive equilibrium.
If a trade ω has not been realized, then it must have not been in b(ω)'s chosen set in the final round T (otherwise both buyer and seller would choose the trade at pricep ω ). That means it was rejected by s(ω) in some round t < T at a lower price p * ω and this price has not changed (by (CP1), (PM), Lemma 14 and Lemma 15). Since prices of other trades have increased (Lemma 14) and using Lemma 17, s(ω) will continue rejecting this trade at p * ω at T . Using (CP3), we can find a pricep ω for every unrealized trade one by one such that the trade is rejected by b(ω) and s(ω). Assign some pricep ω to all such trades. Note that this does not affect the choice of other contracts (since prices are adjusted weakly downward for buyer and weakly upward for the seller and they continue to reject the particular trade; adding rejected trades is irrelevant to choices). Now all trades have been assigned prices giving us a set of contracts κ([Ω * , p * ]) where p * ω = p ω for (ω, p ω ) ∈ A andp otherwise. At these prices agents only choose contracts they were allocated at A; the realized trades Ψ. Hence, this is a competitive equilibrium and (full) trail stability is preserved.
This completes the proof.
